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ABSTRACT 
Lobbying and Regulation in a Political Economy: Evidence from the US Cellular 
Industry 
by Tomaso Duso* 
This paper develops a political-economy model of price regulation. Firms' lobbying 
activity for a given regulatory status might generate a simultaneity problem between the 
effects and the determinants of regulatory decisions. We explicitly model this two way 
causality, and empirically test our model in the U.S. mobile telecommunications 
industry. We find support for our approach: Regulatory choice should be considered 
endogenous. Accounting for the simultaneity bias, we show that regulation, whenever it 
actually took place, did not reduce significantly cellular tariffs. However, it would have 
been more effective if applied in those markets which have not been regulated. To 
explain this finding, we show that firms' lobbying activity on regulatory choice has been 
successful, so that firms were able to avoid regulation in those markets where it would 
have been more effective. From the political economy side, we provide evidence that 
the probability of price regulation was higher, ceteris paribus, when the regulator was 
elected by politicians, when the state's governor came from the Republican Party, when 
the government was politically stable, and when the regulation's opportunity costs were 
low. 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Lobbying und Regulierung in einer politischen Ökonomie: Evidenz aus der  
US-amerikanischen Mobilfunk-Industrie 
In diesem Beitrag wird ein polit-ökonomisches Modell der Preisregulierung entwickelt. 
Es wird explizit berücksichtigt, daß die Unternehmen die Regulierungsentscheidung der 
Aufsichtsbehörde beeinflussen können, um ihre Interessen zu vertreten, und deswegen 
kann ein Simultaneitätsproblem zwischen den Determinanten und den Wirkungen der 
Regulierungsentscheidung entstehen. Anhand von US-amerikanischen Daten für die 
Mobilfunk-Industrie (1984-1988) kann die Hypothese, daß die 
Regulierungsentscheidung endogen durch das Verhalten der Unternehmen am Markt 
mitbestimmt wird, nicht verworfen werden. Bei Berücksichtigung dieser Simultaneität 
kann gezeigt werden, daß die Regulierung die Mobilfunktarife nicht stark gesenkt hat, 
wo sie angewandt wurde. Jedoch zeigt das ökonometrische Modell, daß die Regulierung 
gerade in solchen Märkten effektiver gewesen wäre, die tatsächlich nicht reguliert 
wurden. Dieses Phänomen läßt sich durch die Theorie des Lobbying erklären. Bewirkt 
Regulierung große Preissenkungen, so haben die Unternehmen einen großen Anreiz 
durch Lobbying eine Regulierung der Mobilfunktarife abzuwehren, mit der Wirkung, 
daß seltener reguliert wird. Sind die Wirkungen der Regulierung hingegen gering, so 
sind auch die Lobbying-Anreize klein und Regulierung wird häufiger beobachtet. 
Außerdem zeigt sich, daß die Regulierungswahrscheinlichkeit eines Marktes – ceteris 
paribus - stieg, wenn die Regulierungsbehörde von Bürgern gewählt wurde, wenn der 
Gouverneur des Bundesstaats der republikanischen Partei angehörte, wenn die 
Regierung politisch stabil war und wenn die Opportunitätskosten der Regulierung 
gering waren. 
“There have been wide di¤erences between commissions and
in their legislative mandates, and changes over time in the polit-
ical environment in which they operate (...), however these com-
missions become increasingly solicitous and protective of the in-
terests of the companies they are supposed to regulate, resistant
to change, wedded to the status quo” Kahn [1988] p. 11 vol. 2.
1 Introduction
Over the last decades, economic regulation has attracted great attention
among economists and policymakers, becoming one of the main issues on the
political agenda. From a positive perspective, much theoretical analysis on
the political economy side has been done since the seminal contribution by
Stigler [1971], and following the tradition initiated by the so called “Chicago
School” (Pelzman [1976], Posner [1974], Becker [1983]). This tradition as-
sumes that the political process and the competition among di¤erently or-
ganized interest groups drive regulatory decisions. In particular, as Stigler
suggested, regulated industries (…rms) might be willing to collaborate in their
own regulation, in order to create or to protect their private interests.
From the empirical point of view, though, there has been little attempt
to analyze these questions in such a broad framework. The large body of
existing empirical literature has focused on the e¤ects of regulation on market
outcome, putting less weight on the process which determines the observed
regulatory regime. However, if …rms can in‡uence the regulatory regime
under which they operate, a two way causality between the e¤ects and the
determinants of regulatory decisions has to be accounted for. Studies which
neglected this simultaneity can be seriously biased in their empirical …ndings.
This paper develops a political economy model of regulation as a …rst
attempt to empirically study this set of questions. We shall present a re-
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duced form simultaneous model for …rms pricing behavior and price regula-
tory choice, which encompasses economic as well as political factors to explain
the role of economic regulation. The main point we will make is methodolog-
ical: the endogeneity of regulatory choice, motivated by political economy
reasons, has to be explicitly considered to empirically model the impact of
regulation on prices. Moreover, taking this consideration into account, we
want to determine the (unbiased) impact of price regulation on cellular tari¤s
using U.S. data for the second half of the 1980’s. Finally, we are also inter-
ested in identifying the main determinants of regulatory choice, considering
variables such as the …rms’ lobbying activity, consumer protection, as well as
other political factors.
Because of its particular structure, the U.S. cellular telephone industry
provides a unique environment to analyze the issues mentioned above. The
Federal Communication Commission (FCC) divided the U.S. territory in
precisely de…ned geographical markets and regulated entry allowing only two
cellular operators in each area. On the other side, the jurisdiction over price
regulation was left to the individual States, because of the service’s local
nature. Price regulatory decisions have been widely heterogenous across the
di¤erent States, providing an exceptional “natural experiment” for a study
on the role of regulation on prices as well as on the determinants of regulatory
choice.
There are some other contributions that have empirically analyzed the
impact of regulation on the price level in the U.S. cellular industry. They
generally tested whether exogenous regulatory variables have a signi…cant
impact on prices using a reduced form approach.1 The results they obtained
1Similar analyses, which took the same kind of approach, were performed for the wire-
line telecommunications industry as well. See among others Mathios and Rogers [1989],
Kaestner and Kahn [1989], Tardi¤ and Taylor [1993], and also Kriedel, Sappington and
Weisman [1996] for a survey.
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are contradictory. Ruiz [1995] found that the regulatory variables did not
signi…cantly explain prices, and concluded that the analysis did not allow
any policy suggestions. Shew [1994] and Hausman [1995] observed that the
regulatory variables were signi…cant and that the sign of the coe¢cient was
positive. This …nding suggests that prices rise with regulation.2 The main
explanation has been that regulation led to higher prices because it facil-
itated collusion. The regulatory body, in fact, could have acted as a car-
tel board which made …rms’ pricing strategies common knowledge (Porter
[1983a, 1983b]). This information dispersion could have made it easier for
…rms to recognize if someone had chiseled, making collusion easier to sustain.
Another analysis of the e¤ects of regulation in the U.S. cellular industry is
Parker and Röller [1997]. They speci…ed a structural model to estimate
whether the duopolistic industry structure led to a competitive outcome.
The main …ndings are that the U.S. cellular industry’s conduct was anti-
competitive and that multimarket contact, cross-ownership, and regulation
played a role in explaining this result.
All the previous empirical studies may be subject to a signi…cant mis-
speci…cation problem (Mathios and Rogers [1989], Teske [1991a, 1991b], and
Baron [1995]). If regulated …rms have some control over the regulatory regime
under which they operate, then treating regulatory variables as exogenous
introduces selection bias (Heckman [1976, 1979]). It is therefore necessary to
endogenize regulatory choice, which is one of the contributions of this paper.
There exists some empirical literature dealing with the endogeneity of
regulatory decisions. The typical approach is to explain the discrete choice
2In fact, Hausman [1995] pointed out that “A possible objection that higher prices may
lead to regulation, thus causing the regulation variable to be jointly endogenous, does not
make economic sense in the cellular context. [...] Nevertheless, I estimated the model using
instrumental variables”. The endogeneity of regulation is, in his view, not determined by
political economy reason like we think. The results are una¤ected by the used estimation
methodology.
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among di¤erent regulatory plans using political and economic variables.3 The
regulatory policy in the wireline U.S. telecommunications industry has been
empirically analyzed, …rst in a static and then in a dynamic setting, by Don-
ald and Sappington [1995, 1997]. They found evidence that both the political
as well as the regulatory history were important determinants of the chosen
regulatory regime. Teske [1991a, 1991b] used a rent-seeking approach to
address more clearly the issue about …rms speci…c “political strategies” to
achieve the desired regulatory environment in the wireline U.S. telecommu-
nications market. In particular he showed that U.S. West, one of the “Baby
Bells,” seemed to have adopted the strategy of avoiding regulators, and ag-
gressively in‡uenced legislators in order to achieve the desired deregulation
of the (wired-line telecommunications) markets in which it operated. Yet,
all these studies, except partially the last one, neglected the importance of
…rms’ strategic behavior in in‡uencing the regulatory game.
Empirically, our paper bridges between these two di¤erent approaches,
accounting for the simultaneity between …rms’ pricing behavior and regu-
latory decisions. This is not merely a question of enhancing the analysis’
complexity, but rather it is an important qualitative step into the empiri-
cal modelling of the political economy of regulation. The econometric tool
that is appropriate to achieve this goal is an endogenous switching regression
model (Maddala and Nelson [1975], Lee [1978, 1979]), which is a simultane-
ous equations model with a binary qualitative variable (regulatory status)
and limited dependent variables (regulated and non-regulated tari¤s).
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we give a description of
the market analyzing some preliminary statistics. In Section 3 we derive
3For another modeling approach see the paper by Kroszner and Strahn [1999] on the
economics and politics of banking deregulation. They contrasts private interest theory vs.
public interest theory of regulation and empirically test them on the relaxation of bank
branching restrictions in the U.S. since the 1970’s.
4
a theoretical framework that will be our starting point for the empirical
analysis. Section 4 deals with the empirical speci…cation and the econometric
analysis. We present our main results in Section 5 and close the paper in
Section 6 with some concluding remarks.
2 A Description of the Market and of the
Data
The regulatory environment in the U.S. cellular market is quite unique. The
…rst regulatory decision, in the late 1970’s, was to split entry and price regula-
tions. Regulatory jurisdiction was assigned to di¤erent agencies: the Federal
Government (Federal Communication Commission) kept the right to regu-
late entry through its authority to assign radio spectrum to cellular services
providers. Despite the fact that the magnitude of economies of scale could
have been substantial, the …nal decision of the commission in 1981 was to
allow entry of two cellular service providers in each area.4 The …rst (“wire-
line”) license was typically awarded to a regional Bell operating company
(the RBOC), which was operating in the same area, and the second (“non-
wireline” license) was assigned mainly to independent companies.5 Reselling
4The FCC divided the country into nonoverlapping markets corresponding to the 306
Standard Metropolitan and 428 Rural Statistical Areas (SMSAs and SRSAs respectively).
In this paper we will concentrate only on the former which are represented in Figure 1.
5This decision was controversial. FCC’s main concern was that of the natural monopoly
nature of the industry (this view was also sustained by AT&T), which would suggest to
allow only one …rm operating in the market. A di¤erent approach was proposed by the
Antitrust division of the Department of Justice (DOJ), which advocated the awarding of
a higher number of licences (4 or 8). The concern was that, given the uncertainty about
the magnitude of economy of scale, there was the risk of allowing too little entry. The
main point of the Antitrust Division of the DOJ was that the market should determine
the optimal number of …rms which can operate e¢ciently.
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of licences was allowed, the only prohibition being that the same operator
may not own both licences in one area. The process of awarding licences
took several years and some of the nonwireline licences were resold by …rms
who won the lottery but were not really interested in operating in the cellular
market. The long discussion about how the licences should be awarded and
the length of time it took to allocate the licenses,6 led to delays in the intro-
duction of cellular services which implied high cost to the U.S. economy.7 At
the beginning of the 1990’s in almost all of the SMSAs two operators were
able to o¤er their services. Regarding the concern about market competi-
tiveness where only two …rms operate, the FCC required cellular operators to
o¤er service at wholesale prices also to “resellers”. Furthermore, it imposed
the prohibition of limiting the number of resellers in a market. As Shew
[1994] pointed out, the positive e¤ect of reseller competition was limited in
many markets.
Even if the entry policy of the FCC raised some doubts in relation to the
e¤ective competitiveness, which could be reached in a duopoly market, and
even though there were some concerns about the fact that wireline companies
had some advantages given by their head-start position, more or less half of
the States decided against the use of price regulation. In only a few States
have cellular tari¤s been strictly regulated, whereas in others only loosely
regulated, and in most States they have not been regulated at all. Some
States even adopted some form of a regulatory ban, either at the legislative
level or at the Public Utility Commission’s (PUC) level. This can be ac-
counted for, for instance, by a general skepticism against price regulation.
6Gruber and Verboven [1998], using OECD data, stress the signi…cant role that the
timing of the licences played in explaining di¤usion of cellular services: States which …rst
granted licences seem to have a fairly long persistent lead.
7The cost was estimated to be about 86 billion dollars (Rohlfs, Jackson, and Kelly
[1991]). See also Hausman [1997] for an estimate of the welfare cost of delaying the
introduction of new services in telecommunications.
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The lack of information about costs was one major problem as well, a fact
which would have made an assessment of proposed prices di¢cult. An al-
ternative explanation, which will be the core of our analysis, is that many
States adopted some form of regulatory ban, because of the lobbying activ-
ity of some …rms, whose rent seeking strategy has been directed to avoid a
regulated environment. Shew [1994] and Ruiz [1995] provide detailed infor-
mation about the di¤erent regulatory regimes implemented in the individual
States. We refer to these papers for a deeper analysis. In our work we will
not concentrate on the di¤erent forms of regulation. In this …rst approach we
want to test whether regulation, in any form, had some clear e¤ect on …rms
pricing behavior compared to a non-regulation situation, and to investigate
what determines the choice for a regulatory ban.8
Our data come from di¤erent sources and cover the time spanning De-
cember 1984 to July 1988.9 The original data set contains information about
service prices, input factor prices, demand variables, and industry structure
variables. The sample contains information about 122 SMSAs. We then
enlarged the original data set to encompass information about the politi-
cal and regulatory environment using data from the Statistical Abstract of
the United States, from the Book of the States, and information from the
states’ regulatory commissions. Table 1 presents the summary statistics for
the relevant variables. The …rst column refers to the full sample, whereas the
second and the third refer to the subsamples of non-regulated and regulated
markets respectively.10 In the Appendix we provide a short description of
8It is worth noting that di¤erent regulatory regimes may have di¤erent e¤ects on pricing
behavior. In this paper we will not consider this issue, even though later we will brie‡y
discuss this point.
9We owe a particular thank to Lars-Hendrik Röller and Phil Parker for providing us with
the main data set. A description of the sources as well as a deeper analysis of the data can
be found in their paper (Parker and Röller [1997]). Most variables have yearly frequence,
although some of the prices were collected more than once per year when avaiable.
10Non-regulated markets are those markets where a ban on price regulation was imposed
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the variables.
We can observe that prices in regulated markets are, on average, slightly
higher than in non-regulated markets.11 In particular the price p1; referring
to “low usage” (monthly usage of 5 minutes), is on the average about 7%
higher in regulated markets, whereas p2 (monthly usage of 500 minutes) is
around 2% and p3 (monthly usage of 3000 minutes) 0.5% higher in regulated
markets. However, given the high standard deviation, all price di¤erences are
not statistically signi…cant. We do not have …rm speci…c measures of cost, but
we can relay on market speci…c data. One can not observe large di¤erences
among regulated and non-regulated markets, even though in the former most
cost drivers take slightly higher values. Only ENERGY and PRIME are
on the average higher in non-regulated markets. Signi…cant di¤erences can
instead be observed with regard to the variable POP. In regulated markets
population is on the average much higher (40%) than in non-regulated ones.
Also CROSSOWN and MULTIMKT take signi…cantly di¤erent values in
the two subsamples. In particular both variables assume higher values in
non-regulated markets; a fact which could suggest that in those markets
collusive behavior was more probable.12 ENTRY assumes slightly higher
by legislative or regulatory commission’s action. The regulatory data were courtesely
provided by W.B. Shew (see Shew [1994] Table 4.2). In Table 2 we describe the regulatory
variable more in detail.
11The prices of a singular cellular operator are de…ned, as in Parker and Röller [1997], as
the monthly bill paid for a given level of usage. Normally, cellular operators use nonlinear
prices composed by a …xed fee, a usage fee for the “peak hours”, and a usage fee for the
“o¤-peak hours”. Moreover, every operator o¤ers di¤erent plans related to the intensity
of usage (low, middle, or high usage). The prices reported represent the monthly bill cal-
culated for di¤erent monthy usage times (5, 500, 3000 minutes) assuming that consumers
chose the least expensive plan.
12Parker and Röller [1997], in fact, have shown that multimarket contact and crossown-
ership were among the most important determinants of the industry’s collusive conduct.
See also Busse [2000] that, using the data by Parker and Röller, found multimarket contact
to have risen prices by apporximately 7-10%.
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values in regulated markets, meaning that the incumbent’s lead over the
second operator was shorter (LEAD).
Turning to institutional variables, we observe that, in the sample period,
the state’s governor was principally from the Democratic Party (DEM84
and DEM88). However, between 1984 and 1988, the Republicans gained
back many states. Unexpectedly, the Democrats were more present in non-
regulated (81%) than in regulated markets (66%) at the beginning of the
sample period, but they lost more states in the regulated subsample (from
81% to 53%) than in the non-regulated one (from 66% to 64%). Around
58% of the States were politically stable during the sample period and did
not experience a governor change. Also, in this case the di¤erences between
regulated and non-regulated markets are consistent: 72% of the States that
adopted regulation did not experience a change in political majority during
the sample period, while only 43% in the non-regulated markets subsample.
Finally, we have considered some variables directly related to regulators’
characteristics. In general, we observe more appointed (APPOINT) than
elected (ELECTED) regulators in all subsamples. However, the percentage of
elected regulators is lower in regulated markets than in non-regulated ones.13
The number of full-time employees in the State PUC in 1984 (STAFF84)
was much larger in States that adopted price regulation.14 Finally we also
observe that in regulated markets, during the sample period, the size of
the commission has been signi…cantly reduced (¢STAFF), whereas it has
13We would have expected to observe higher values for ELECT in the regulated markets
subsample, under the presumption that elected regulators should be more pro-consumer
(see Besley and Coate [2000]) and therefore should regulate more often. However, as
stressed by Gormley [1981], consumers’ movements seem to be more active in states with
appointed regulators.
14This can be a sign that the cost of regulation was higher in States that did not
regulate. In fact, in those States, the regulatory resources seem to have been more scarce
and therefore the opportunity cost to regulate a new industry might have been higher.
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increased in non-regulated markets. Notice, however, that the variability
was much higher in the former than in the latter case.
Concluding, we do observe some institutional di¤erences among regulated
and non-regulated markets, even though not strongly signi…cant, but we need
an econometric analysis to clearly answer why were some markets regulated
and what kind of e¤ects did regulation have.
3 A Theoretical Framework
In this Section, we will present a theoretical background on which we will
base our empirical analysis, and from which we will derive some hypotheses
to test. It will not be a structural but rather a reduced form model. Despite
the fact that this approach lacks a rigorous micro foundation, it has the
advantage of being more general and of not relying on speci…cal functional
form’s assumptions.15 One should consider our approach as a …rst attempt
to empirically analyze the issue, which should help in understanding the
economics and politics of regulation and which could be followed by a more
rigorous micro founded analysis.16
3.1 The Regulatory Choice
As a starting point, we assume that the regulatory agency uses a simple rule
to determine whether a market should be regulated or not on the basis of
15Recently a micro-founded “common agency” framework based on Bernheim and Whin-
ston [1986] has been developed to study the political determinants of governmental poli-
cies. A path-breaking theoretical application to trade policy is Grossman and Helpman
[1994]. See also Goldberg and Maggi [1999] and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay [2000] for
an empirical implementation.
16For a …rst attempt of a micro-founded model of the political economy of regulation in
a multiprincipal setting see Spiller [1990]. A more recent model, based on the Bernheim’s
and Whinston’s approach, has been developed by Trillas [2000].
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the regulation’s e¤ects on prices. If regulation is thought to decrease prices
“enough”, then it is adopted. One can think to this rule as representing a kind
of optimality condition for a regulator that maximizes a sum of total welfare
and of private interests. At the optimum the regulator weights marginal
bene…ts of regulation to its marginal costs. We can then write a reduced
form equation which constitutes the decisional criterion for the regulator:





¢ ¡ log ¡p0ts¢¤ + ®2RSCts + ®3PVts + ®4RCts + ²ts:
(1)
where [log (p1ts)¡ log (p0ts)] is the di¤erence between non-regulated and
regulated prices, RSC is a vector of characteristics speci…c to the regulator,
PV is a vector of political variables, and RC is a measure of the cost of
regulation.17 One does not observe the variable R¤ts, which is latent, but
rather a binary variable that indicates whether a market is regulated (Rts =
1) or not (Rts = 0). One can thus interpret equation (1) as a probit model:
Market s will be regulated in time t (and thus we observe Rts = 1) if and
only if R¤ts > 0 and will not be regulated otherwise.
The coe¢cient ®1 plays a crucial role in our empirical analysis, since
it allows us to identify the role of …rms’ lobbying activity vs. consumers
protection. Assuming a benevolent regulator, which cares principally of the
consumer surplus (that is the welfare standard adopted in the U.S. antitrust
policy), one would expect to observe a signi…cant and positive value for the
coe¢cient ®1: regulation is more probable when the bene…ts that it implies





rts: On the right hand side one has the di¤erence between non-regulated (p0ts) and regulated
(p1ts) prices and, on the left hand side, a maximal price di¤erence accepted by the regulator.
This level rts can be made dependent on variables which should determine regulator’s
willingness to regulate.
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in terms of lower prices are larger.18 On the other hand, one can also as-
sume that the regulatory agency is not benevolent but rather self-interested,
and that interest groups, as well as individual …rms, can directly in‡uence
its decision through lobbying activity. High prices are in the …rms’ interest.
Therefore, if …rms’ lobbying activity is successful, one should expect a nega-
tive coe¢cient ®1: the probability of regulation should be lower when regu-
lation puts much downward pressure on prices since lobby intensity against
a regulated environment would be higher. The price di¤erence’s coe¢cient
should thus measure the relative weight that the regulator assigns to …rms’
lobbying and to consumers’ protection. In our model we do not exactly spec-
ify what lobbying is; we assume that it is any action taken by the interest
group (e.g. the …rm) to in‡uence regulator’s decision.
The only measures for regulator speci…c characteristics we could use is
whether the regulator was appointed by the state’s governor, or directly
elected. Besley and Coate [2000] gives a theoretical rationale for the impor-
tance of this issue and, in particular, they show that elected regulator should
be more “pro-consumer”. This would mean that, whenever regulation does
not increase prices, one should observe a positive relationship between the
probability of regulation and the fact of being elected rather than appointed
by politicians.
We insert the political variables to account for di¤erent e¤ects. First, in
many states the regulatory ban was imposed at the legislative level, therefore
the governor’s political orientation should account for its speci…c preferences
in the regulatory policy. Second, the political orientartion of the party in
power can be seen, according to Donald and Sappington [1995, 1997], as a
measure of the political costs of choosing a regulated regime for the mobile
industry. Third, one may want to control for political variables because the
18As long as the consumer surplus is included in the welfare function maximized by the
regulator, the coe¢cient ®1 cannot be negative.
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political environment shapes …rms’ rent seeking strategy, as shown by Teske
[1991].
We also control for regulation’s costs as proxied by the number of full
time employees in the PUC. The main idea is that large PUCs should bare a
smaller opportunity cost to set up a regulatory regime in a new industry than
smaller ones, for their resources are less scarce. Our expectation is thus to
observe higher probability of regulation in states with larger PUCs. Finally,
we also use the change in the PUC’s composition as a regressor, since it
should be more di¢cult to capture a regulator when the PUC’s composition
widely varies, because of the lack of long standing relationships.
The main problem with the presented approach is that, for each obser-
vation, we observe either the regulated price or the non-regulated one, while
in (1) we need to compare both prices for each observation. In each regime
we need a measure for the price which is not observed, i.e. the price that
…rms would have chosen if the other regime had prevailed. Our empirical
speci…cation will help us to overcome this problem.
3.2 Firms Pricing Behavior
Because prices are endogenously chosen by …rms, we also need to model
…rms’ pricing behavior and determine a reduced form price equation. It is
a well known result in the theory of tacit collusion in supergame that the
monopoly price can be part of a tacitly collusive equilibrium outcome for
certain conditions on the discount factor (Porter [1983a]). The cellular price
in market s at time t (pts) should be a mark up (¹ts) over marginal costs
(MCts): pts = MCts ¢¹ts. Taking logs of both sides we otain a linear relation:
logpts = logMCts + log ¹ts: (2)
Since we can not directly observe marginal costs and mark-up, we need to
model them through an equation. We assume that the marginal cost is a
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function of cost drivers (CD) and of …rms speci…c dummies (firmi) which
should capture the possible heterogeneity in …rms’ technology:
log(MCts) = logMC (CDts; f irmits) (3)
Similarly, we assume that the mark-up depends on the level of demand (Q)
and on vector of market structure variables (MSV ) such as multimarket
contact, crossownership, the competitive pressure as generated by the second
…rm entering the market, and the status of the wireline/non-wireline pair
(Pair_jts), which should capture the argument that some …rms’ pairs achieve
collusive agreements easier than others. We then have:
log(¹ts) = log ¹ts (Qts;MSVts; Pair_jts) (4)
Since demand is endogenous we also need an equation which explains the
demanded quantity:
Qts = Qts (pts; DDts) ; (5)
where DD are demand drivers. Assuming linearity and substituting equa-
tions (3), (4), and (5) into equation (2), we obtain a reduced form price
equation as follows:
log pts = ¯0 + ¯1CDts + ¯2DDts + ¯3MSVts + ¯4firmits + ¯5Pair_jts + uts;
(6)
where uts is an error term. We also expect that regulation might have an
impact on …rms’ pricing behavior, since di¤erent regulatory regimes should
provide cellular operators with di¤erent incentives. To account for the fact
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that the independent variables should have a di¤erent impact on prices, de-
pending on which regime prevails, we specify one reduced form price equation
for each regime and allow coe¢cients to di¤er in the two regimes. Further-
more, the adopted econometric model also involves the use of a correction
term in the price equations, which should account for the selectivity bias that
arises from the fact of being in one particular regime.
4 Speci…cation and Empirical Implementation
As we mentioned before, regulated …rms often have in‡uence over the reg-
ulatory regimes under which they operate. We take this issue into account
in our empirical analysis by estimating a model of endogenous switching
(Maddala and Nelson [1975], Lee [1978]). This is a simultaneous equations
model with a binary qualitative variable for the regulatory status and limited
(censored) dependent variables: the prices. The empirical implementation of
the theoretical framework analyzed in the previous Section implies thus the
speci…cation of equation (1), and of two price equations like (6), one for each
of the two subsamples:
R¤ts = ®0 + ®1
¡
log p0ts ¡ log p1ts
¢
+ ®2Zts + ²ts (7)
Rts = 1 if R¤ts > 0 and Rts = 0 otherwise






ts + u1ts if Rts = 1 (8)






ts + u0ts if Rts = 0 (9)
15






Where XRts, R = 0; 1, contains cost drivers CDts (OPERATE, ENERGY,
WAGE, RENT, and PRIME) demand drivers DDts (POP and BUSINESS),
and a time trend (T) to control for market growth. Furthermore, we in-
sert some variables to control for market structure (MSVts): a dummy
equal to one if the second carrier has already entered market s in time
t (ENTRY), variables related to cross-ownership and multimarket contact
(CROSSOWN and MULTIMKT), a variable controlling for the monopolist’s
lead over the second entrant (LEAD), …rm speci…c dummies (FIRMi) for the
major carriers, and some dummy variables to control for market structure
(BELLBELL, INDBELL, and INDIND).19 The vector Zts contains regulator
speci…c variables RCVts (ELECT and APPOINT), political variables PVts
(GOVCHANGE and DEM), as well as two proxy for the cost of regula-
tion CRts (STAFF and ¢STAFF). As already mentioned we assume that
the independent variables’ coe¢cients in (8) and (9) are di¤erent, allowing
complete interaction in the price equations. This assumption, which should
capture the di¤erent incentives faced by …rms in the di¤erent regimes, will
be tested in the next Section. We assume that the error terms are jointly
normally distributed, with a variance-covariance matrix given by (10).20
19According to Parker and Röller [1997], each of these dummy variables (see the Ap-
pendix for a de…nition) “signi…es the status of the wireline-nonwireline pair.” Note that
we do not insert the dummy BELLIND because there is a constant term in our equation.
BELLIND represents thus our reference market structure. Ee eliminate one …rm dummy
(CENTEL), as well.
20The terms ½i (i = 0;1) represent the correlation co¢cient between error terms uits
(i = 0;1) and ²st. Note that Cov (uits; ²ts) = ½i¾i¾² = ½i¾i because ¾² = 1. Note also that
the correlation between the error terms of the two price equations (½12) is not estimable
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As Heckman [1976] and others pointed out, there exists a selectivity bias
problem that leads to inconsistent parameter estimates when estimating the
price equations separately by OLS, for E [uits jRts = i] 6= 0 (i = 0;1). To
overcome this problem, one needs to correct for the endogeneity of regulation.
Following Lee [1978], we can construct two selectivity bias terms as follows:
E [u1ts jR¤ts > 0] = ½1¾1 [Á (®0zts) =©(®0zts)] and
E [u0ts jR¤ts  0] = ½0¾0 [¡Á (®0zts) = (1¡ © (®0zts))]
for the regulated and non-regulated markets subsamples respectively, where
Á (¢) and © (¢) are respectively the density and the cumulative function of a
standard normal distribution.
The estimation procedure is as follows. Equation (7) accounts for the sep-
aration criterium and can be consistently estimated by a probit ML method.
Because we do not observe both prices for each observation, in the …rst stage
we estimate a reduced form of the probit equation where we substitute (8)
and (9) in (7). Once we get consistent estimates of the ®’s, we can compute
^¸
1ts = Á (®^
0zts) =©(®^
0zts) and ^¸0ts = ¡Á (®^0zts) = (1¡ © (®^0zts)), using the
estimated instead of the real parameters’ values. After inserting the selectiv-
ity bias terms as a control in the pricing schedules, we can then consistently
estimate the ¯, the ½i, and the ¾i terms by simultaneously estimating (7),
(8) and (9) by FIML (Kenny, Lee, Maddala, and Trost [1979]). The last
step consists of estimating by ML the structural probit, where we insert the
estimated prices instead of the real values.21
The typical test of selectivity bias is to analyze whether the coe¢cients of
¸its (i = 0; 1) are signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. But from the sign and size
of the coe¢cient estimates we can learn even more, namely how the selectivity
since each observation comes from one regime. For references see Maddala [1987].
21One could also try to estimate the model in one step. Although the estimates’ e¢ciency
would be higher, the method is operationally cumbersome.
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terms in‡uence pricing behavior, since they represent the covariance between
the error terms of the price equations and of the separation criterion. As
Maddala [1987] pointed out, “[...] we ought to observe ½0 ¡ ½1 > 0, but the
two covariances can have any sign. It is also important to estimate the mean
values of the dependent variable for the alternative choices.” In our model
this would mean estimating the price in regulated markets had they not been
regulated and vice versa. In this way we can determine regulation’s e¤ects
on prices.
5 Results and Interpretation
In this section we analyze the results of the full information ML estimation
of the switching regression model. We …rst present the results concerning the
two pricing relations. In order to enrich our analysis, and to observe whether
regulation had di¤erent e¤ects on di¤erent cellular tari¤s, we will propose
di¤erent speci…cations in which we use as the dependent variable the three
available price measures. In this way we also will capture the di¤erent …rms’s
strategies in di¤erent market segments.
Table 3 reports the coe¢cient estimates for the reduced form price equa-
tion in the subsample of regulated markets while Table 4 reports the results
relative to the non-regulated markets.
Before analyzing in detail the coe¢cient estimates for the other inde-
pendent variables, we want to observe the role of the selection bias in both
subsamples, since this is one of the main points of our analysis. The selectiv-
ity terms’ coe¢cients are given by the product between ½i and ¾i, i = 0; 1.
In the regulated markets’ subsample both ½1 and ¾1 are strongly statisti-
cally signi…cant in all speci…cations. In particular, the product of the two
coe¢cients is negative, implying that the fact of being in a regulated market
has put some downward pressure on cellular tari¤s. Later we will precisely
18
quantify this e¤ect. In non-regulated markets the selectivity bias correction’s
coe¢cient is highly signi…cant as well. Both ½0 and ¾0 are statistically sig-
ni…cant in the …rst and third speci…cations, while only the variance ¾0 is
signi…cant in the second one. In this case we observe a positive coe¢cient’s
estimate for the selection terms which means that a lack of regulation should
have increased prices. The signi…cance of these terms in both subsamples
and in all speci…cations is the …rst compelling result of our analysis: the
endogeneity of regulatory choice must be accounted for. The price estimate
that we would obtain without correcting for selectivity bias would in fact be
inconsistent and biased. Furthermore, we obtain a …rst result which seems
to go in the opposite direction than previously observed by the literature.
Later we shall analyze this point more in depth.
Now we turn to the description of the regression’s results relative to …rms’
pricing behavior. We start with the regulated markets’ subsample (Table 3).
The …rst interesting point is that there are evident di¤erences in pricing
behavior among low usage time tari¤s on the one hand, and middle and
high usage time tari¤s on the other.22 Particularly compelling is the …nding
that entry pressure (ENTRY) led to signi…cantly lower usage tari¤s only
in the lower market segment, whereas it did not a¤ect prices for middle
and high usage times. Moreover, the only determinants of regulated prices
for higher usage, apart from the selectivity bias term, are some demand
drivers and, only partially, demand drivers and market structure variables.
Surprisingly almost none of the cost drivers is statistically signi…cant in all
speci…cations. The only exception are WAGE in the second speci…cation,
which is unexpectedly negative, and RENT in the third which is, instead,
22This is not surprising. The sample period corresponds to the very early phase of
cellular telecommunications in the U.S.. During that period, most of the customers were
business people who probably made a more extensive usage of cellular services. Firms’




Demand drivers are more signi…cant, though coe¢cients’ sign, size, and
signi…cance vary widely across speci…cations as well. The population size
(POP) had a positive impact on prices which is signi…cant only in the …rst
speci…cation. In all speci…cations one observes a positive coe¢cient’s esti-
mate for BUSINESS, which is signi…cant only for the middle usage segment.
As expected, the time trend (T) is negative in all speci…cations, since demand
should expand and become more price elastic with time, but it is signi…cant
only in the middle usage and high usage speci…cations. The market growth
generated downward pressure on prices only in the business segment, which
was the fastest developing in the sample period.
Market structure variables are also partially signi…cant in the regulated
market subsample. In the middle usage segment the head start advantage
of the …rst license owner (LEAD) led to a small increase in cellular tari¤s,
whereas it did not a¤ect low usage prices. Low usage tari¤s, instead, depend
signi…cantly on multimarket contact (MULTIMKT) and on cross-ownership
(CROSSOWN), but the two e¤ects go in opposite directions. While MUL-
TIMKT seems to have increased tari¤s, as expected, cross-ownership seems
to have decreased them.
Firm speci…c terms and …rms-pair dummies are not signi…cant at all in the
second and third speci…cations. Only in the low usage segment the market
structure where a ROBOC entered a market with an independent incumbent
put some downward pressure on tari¤s. In regulated markets the kind of
…rms pair operating in the market did not strongly in‡uence the price level.
One possible interpretation of our …ndings is that regulated prices were
not set by …rms but rather by the regulator. This is because …rms speci…c
characteristics do not seem to have in‡uenced regulated prices, while those
variables that should explain, at least partially, consumer surplus - like de-
mand drivers, and the selectivity bias correction to account for regulation-
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are the main signi…cant cellular tari¤s’ determinants.
We now turn to the non-regulated markets’ subsample. Here we observe
some di¤erences among the di¤erent speci…cations as well, which suggest dif-
ferent pricing strategies in the di¤erent market’s segments. In the second
and third speci…cations prices are very signi…cantly dependent on …rm spe-
ci…c e¤ects. Not only are the …rms’ dummies very signi…cant, but also the
wireline/non-wireline pairs’ dummies present highly signi…cant coe¢cient es-
timates.23 In particular, it seems that markets where an independent carrier
owned the wireline license were more competitive in the sense that prices
were lower with respect to the reference group, which includes the BELLIND
pair. The presence of two baby Bells in the same non-regulated market has
instead considerably increased prices in the middle and high usage segments,
meaning that two baby Bells could have been better able to collude. On
the other side, however, this market structure led to more price competition
in the low usage segment (BELLBELL’s coe¢cient estimate is negative and
signi…cant). Also, it is interesting to note that multimarket contact (MUL-
TIMKT) has a positive impact on tari¤s but is signi…cant only in the …rst
speci…cation.
A last minor but interesting comment may be done with regard to the
entry policy. Competitive pressure imposed by the second …rm entering the
market did not push downwards middle and high usage time tari¤s. The
negative and signi…cant impact of entry in the low usage segment could have
been motivated by a more aggressive pricing strategy by entrant …rms, in
order to enlarge the non-business costumers base.
Before moving to the direct analysis of the price regulation’s e¤ects on
tari¤s, we want to statistically test whether coe¢cient estimates di¤er among
23The most of …rms’ speci…c dummies are strongly signi…cant in all speci…cations
(PACTEL, BELLSTH, AMERTECH, SWBELL, and MCCAW); USWEST, REST, GTE,
and CONTEL are signi…cant only in some, while only NY NEX is not signi…cant at all .
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the two subsamples using a Wald test.24 We strongly reject the hypothesis
that the same coe¢cients apply to the two subgroups for all speci…cations at
any usual con…dence level. This means that the explanatory variables in the
two subgroups have di¤erent e¤ects on the …rms’ pricing strategy, since they
interact with the fact of being regulated or not: …rms’ behavior is in‡uenced
by price regulation.
Previous studies suggested that regulation should have increased cellular
tari¤s, since the regulatory dummies have a positive impact on prices. To
asses more directly the regulation’s impact on cellular tari¤s, we can ask
which the prices in regulated markets would have been, had these markets





We can now use the consistent estimates of ¯i, ½i, and ¾i, i = 0; 1, and
calculate the predicted regulated and non-regulated prices for the regulated
markets’ subsample. Table 5 reports the summary statistics for the predicted
prices in regulated markets (p^1), in regulated markets had they not been reg-
ulated (p^1;0), and for the di¤erence between the two. The predicted regulated
prices are on average lower than the predicted non-regulated prices in every
speci…cation. This would mean that (on average) regulation has decreased
prices by 14%, 10%, and 14% ca. for low, middle, and high usage tari¤s,
respectively. This would reverse the results obtained with dummy variables
models. However, we can also note that the standard deviation of the dif-
ference between the two prices is very large. Hence, to reach a more precise
conclusion, we can test the null hypothesis p^1 = p^1;0. We can not accept the
null hypothesis at any usual con…dence level for any of the used price mea-
sures. In Figure 2, we plot the sample distribution of the price di¤erences in














which is distributed as a chi-squared with J degrees of freedom, where J is the num-
ber of restrictions we are testing. See Green [1993].
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the di¤erent subsamples.
This …nding would then mean that regulation, where it was applied, did
not have very evident e¤ects on reducing prices: in some markets it was
e¤ective, in other not. Yet, our main simplifying assumption is to consider
regulation as a single entity. This is indeed not the case. As we already
mentioned regulatory plans vary widely across States. There is then much
heterogeneity in regulatory decisions that is not encompassed in our approach
and that could be an important element to explain the observed result that
e¤ective regulation did not have a strong impact on prices.25
We can also do the same exercise for non-regulated markets and ask
what the prices in these markets would have been, had they been regulated
(p^0;1).26 In Table 6 we report our results. Predicted prices in non-regulated
markets, had regulation occurred, would have been lower than predicted non-
regulated prices in all speci…cations (8.5%, 3%, and 8% for low, middle, and
high usage tari¤s, respectively). We can again perform a simple test of the
null hypothesis p^0;1 = p^0. Now we can accept the null hypothesis at the
10% con…dence level for middle and high usage tari¤s, but not for low usage
ones. This means that regulation would have signi…cantly decreased prices for
those customers who made extensive use of cellular services in non-regulated
markets. The second line of Figure 2 represents the sample distribution for
the price di¤erence in the non-regulated markets’ subsample. The positive
e¤ects, which regulation would have had, are clearly evident in the middle
and high usage tari¤s case. There is almost no observation above the zero
line: in almost all markets these prices would have fallen.
25A possible extension of our model, which would take this issue into account, would be
the use of a nested logit approach to explain regulatory choice, instead of the simple probit
analysis as we did. This would allow us to consider that, once the regulator has chosen to
regulate, it must also choose which kind of regulation to apply. In this way we would be
able to account for the di¤erent regulatory choices that the authority has to take.
26We calculate E[p1ts jRts = 0] = b¯10x0ts +b½1b¾1 £¡Á ¡b®0zts¢= ¡1 ¡© ¡b®0zts¢¢¤ :
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Summarizing, we observed that regulation was not very e¤ective in re-
ducing cellular tari¤s in regulated markets, probably also because of the
heterogeneity of the regulatory schemes that we encompass under the la-
bel “regulated markets”. On the other hand, it seems that cellular tari¤s
would have fallen signi…cantly, even if not substantially, if regulation had
been adopted in non-regulated markets, especially for the business sector
segment. Where the wrong markets regulated?
To answer this question we estimate the structural probit by ML, where
we use as regressors the di¤erence between predicted non-regulated and reg-
ulated prices as well as other political and regulatory variables, as we derived
in the previous Section. As we already noted, we use the three estimated price
di¤erences simultaneously as regressor to account for di¤erent …rms’ lobby-
ing intensity in di¤erent market segments. The coe¢cient of the di¤erence
between the non-regulated and regulated prices should help us to disentangle
two e¤ects: …rms lobbying activity, which would imply a negative coe¢cient,
and consumers’ protection, which would instead imply a positive coe¢cient’s
estimate.
We present di¤erent speci…cations depending on the set of control vari-
ables that we used. First, we use the exogenous variables alone. We then pro-
pose a speci…cation which controls for …rms’ …xed e¤ects and one which con-
trols for regional e¤ects to try to capture, at least partially, possible market
unobserved heterogeneity.27 We then insert some interaction terms between
the price di¤erences and the other exogenous variables, in order to control
for the interaction between …rms, politicians, and the regulatory agency.28
27We could not exploit the panel component of our data set since the dependent variable,
the regulatory dummy, did not vary along the time dimension during the sample period.
The probit regression is thus run on a cross section.














¤ ¢STAFF where i = 1;2; 3. Precise results
about these variables can be obtained from the author upon request.
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Finally, we try a richer speci…cation where all control variables are used at
once.
Table 7 reports our results. The main interest here is in the sign and
signi…cance of the price di¤erence variables. In all speci…cations the three
price di¤erences are strongly signi…cant. This is a second compelling result of
our analysis. However, both consumer protection and …rms’ lobbying activity
seem to have played a role in the regulatory regime’s choice. The …rst and
third price di¤erences’ parameter estimates present, in fact, a negative sign,
while the second has a positive sign.
This …rst set of results would suggest that …rms concentrated their rent
seeking strategies in those markets where regulation would have hurt more,
i.e. those markets where most of the customers were long-time cellular service
users, and where competition was expected to be tougher because of the low
demand for low usage time. Our …ndings are also consistent with the fact
that the regulator might have concentrated its action in those markets where
…nal consumers, and not intermediate customers such as business people,
were more important, since the positive sign on the middle usage prices
di¤erence. One cannot say much concerning the magnitude of the coe¢cients’
estimates, which represent the marginal e¤ect with respect to the overall
means of the data set. The sign of the coe¢cient determines the direction
of the e¤ect and the e¤ect tends to be larger, the larger is the coe¢cient. In
the last two speci…cations, however, one should bare in mind that the overall
price di¤erence’s e¤ect should account also for the marginal e¤ects obtained
through the interaction terms.
Turning to the other explanatory variables, almost each is highly sig-
ni…cant in every speci…cation. If the State governor in 1984 came from the
Democratic Party, the probability to observe price regulation was lower. This
result is unexpected, given that the Democratic Party is supposed to pur-
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sue a more consumer-oriented policy.29 On the other hand, the probability of
regulation was higher in States that did not experience a political change dur-
ing the sample period. This fact might re‡ect the idea that States in which
political changes occurred were more open toward an innovative regulatory
policy, such as full price liberalization. These results concerning the political
environment are quite robust: both sign and signi…cance level do not vary
much across the di¤erent speci…cations. Only the direct e¤ect of government
stability disappears in the best speci…cation, though the interaction terms
between GOVSTAB and the price di¤erences are all very signi…cant in that
speci…cation.
Also, the regulator speci…c characteristics and regulation’s costs had sig-
ni…cant impact on regulatory choice, but these results are less robust. Look-
ing at the …rst column we observe that elected regulators increased the prob-
ability of regulation compared to the reference group containing APPOINT,
even if not signi…cantly. However, when we insert …rm dummies, this vari-
able turns out to be signi…cant also. Our …ndings would then be in line with
those by Besley and Coate [2000]: elected regulators are supposed to be more
pro-consumer, and therefore should more often regulate, under the assump-
tion that regulation reduces prices. However, the e¤ect of elected regulators
on regulatory choice is not very signi…cant.30 The variable STAFF, which
should proxy for regulation’s costs, presents the expected positive and signif-
icant sign in the …rst, third and last speci…cations. A regulator with higher
resources (larger PUCs) was expected to regulate more often, for its oppor-
tunity cost of regulating a new market should be lower. This e¤ect is anyway
quantitatively very small. Also, the negative and signi…cant sign of ¢STAFF
29This view is also expressed in Posner [1970] where Democratic amministrations are
assumed to be “pro-consumer” while Republican ones to be “pro-business”.
30This is also in line with the …dnings by Teske [1991a, 1991b] and Donald and Sap-
pington [1995, 1997], who did not …nd elected regulators to signi…cally impact regulatory
decisions.
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means that the larger were the changes in the commission’s composition the
lower was the probability of regulation. A possible explanation for this fact is
that large changes in the commission’s personnel could have make less easy to
capture the regulator, because of the lacking of long standing relationships.
Furthermore, it is worth stressing the role of the di¤erent speci…cations.
First, the introduction of the interaction terms, which should more precisely
capture the “political game” among …rms, politicians, and regulator has a
very signi…cant impact on our results.31 Not only are almost all these terms
highly signi…cant and the overall …t of the model greatly improves once one
accounts for them, but also some qualitatively new results appear as, for
instance, we noticed for the signi…cance of the regulation’s cost proxy or for
the role of government stability. This is, in our opinion, an important issue
that calls for a more precise model of these interactions.
The introduction of …rm speci…c terms has an important impact as well.
Almost all …rm speci…c dummies are highly signi…cant in the third and last
speci…cations.32 This …nding reinforces our belief that lobbying for regula-
tion by individual …rms matters. Finally, also regional variables are partially
signi…cant. This would suggest the need of a more precise econometric anal-
ysis, since these dummies should, at least partially, capture some market
unobserved heterogeneity that seems to matter.33
Our last speci…cation, which is also our best one, predicts the right out-
come for the 92.21% of the cases that makes us quite con…dent about the
exactness of our model.
31Spiller [1990] presents a multiple-pricipals theoretical model of the interactions among
politicians, interest groups and regulators, as well as some empirical evidence.
32USWEST and SWBELL are not signi…cant in the second speci…cation, while only
USWEST is not signi…cant in the last one.
33To fully exploit the panel nature of our data set and use a random or …xed (state) e¤ect
model, we should enlarge the data in the time dimension to observe some time variability
in the regulatory status (see Donald and Sappington [1997]).
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6 Conclusions
This paper investigates the political economy of regulation bridging two dif-
ferent approaches of the empirical literature on regulation, and empirically
analyzing the simultaneity between the price regulatory choice and …rms’
pricing behavior. We used data from the U.S. mobile telecommunications
industry because of its unique regulatory environment. The industry under
consideration is quite homogenous for product characteristics, …rms’ technol-
ogy and demand, but heterogenous for the adopted price regulation. Some
States adopted strict price regulation, some loose price regulation, and others
even banned price regulation. The study had di¤erent aims. First, we wanted
to prove that the endogeneity of regulation is an important issue to account
for because …rms do in‡uence the choice of the regime under which they
operate. Second, we wanted to determine the impact of price regulation on
cellular tari¤s, after correcting for the simultaneity bias. Finally, we wanted
to identify the main determinants of regulatory choice. The econometric
method we adopted consists of the estimation of a endogenous switching
regression model (Maddala and Nelson [1975], Lee [1978]). To enrich the
analysis we considered three measures for cellular prices, corresponding to
di¤erent usage times, which allowed us to take into account di¤erent …rms’
strategies in the di¤erent market’s segments.
We provided evidence that the selectivity bias problem, i.e. the endogene-
ity of regulation, is an important issue to account for. Controlling for the
simultaneity problem, we have shown that prices in regulated markets were,
on average, lower than the prices …rms would have set, had these markets not
been regulated. But the impact of regulation is not observed to be statisti-
cally signi…cant: price regulation, where applied, has not been very e¤ective.
On the other hand, however, we observed that prices in non-regulated mar-
kets would have signi…cantly fallen, if regulation would have been adopted.
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Our approach enabled us to explain this unexpected result, since we also
modeled the regulatory choice, using a probit analysis. After controlling for
other important factors such as the political environment, regulator speci…c
characteristics, and the regulation’s cost we provided some robust evidence
that …rms’ lobbying activity against a regulated environment was successful.
Also, we provided evidence that regulator’s characteristics, political vari-
ables, as well as the interactions between …rms, politicians, and regulators
have very high explanatory power for the regulatory choice. Elected reg-
ulators, ceteris paribus, enhanced the probability of regulation more than
appointed ones. Furthermore, States where the governor came from the Re-
publican Party, whose government was politically stable in the sample period,
and where regulation’s opportunity cost have been lower were more favorable
to some kinds of price regulation. Finally, the more pronounced the changes
in the public utility commission’s composition, the lower the probability of
regulation, all other things being equal.
We can then conclude that our empirical approach, which allows the ex-
plicit modelling of the political economy of regulation, leads to new results
in comparison to those already observed in both streams of the related lit-
erature. We do provide some evidence that price regulation, per se, did
not worked in the wrong direction, increasing cellular tari¤s. E¤ective reg-
ulation, though, did not have a signi…cant impact, because of the …rms’s
lobbying activity to avoid a regulated environment.
Some major caveats apply to our analysis. First, there are still some
important facts that have not been considered in the analysis for lack of
data. For instance, we do not have more precise regulator’s individual char-
acteristics, which might be important determinants of the regulatory choice.
Second, we limited our analysis to the dichotomous regulatory choice, not
considering that di¤erent kinds of price regulation were actually adopted,
that could have had very di¤erent impacts on prices. In particular, this con-
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sideration might help to understand more clearly which kinds of regulatory
schemes did not work. Third, regulatory decisions are not only related to the
simple choice whether to regulate a market or not; the regulatory commis-
sions, in fact, must also decide on many other issues, which are likely to have
an in‡uence on the choice of whether to regulate or not. These issues could
therefore be simultaneously studied in a more general model of regulation,
but in this case new data and a di¤erent econometric modeling approach
would be necessary. Finally, in this paper we adopted a reduced form ap-
proach to the political economy of regulation as well as to …rms’ strategic
behavior, whereas both issues could be approached in a more structural way.
In particular, one should try to provide a rigorous micro foundation for the
interaction among regulatory commissions, legislators, and interest groups.
Hence the results we reported do not have to be considered de…nitive, even if
we believe that they are a …rst important step into a deeper understanding
of the political economy of price regulation.
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Appendix: Variables De…nition
Variables De…nition Vector Source
p1; p2; p3 M onth ly b il l c alc ulated for d i¤ eren t m onth ly usage t im e s (5, 500 , 3000 m inute s) Parker-R öl le r [1997]
ENERG Y Average m onth ly cost p e r square foo t ($ p er ki lowa tt hou r) C D
PR IM E (lagged ) One per io d lagge d prim e lend ing rate
RE NT Average m onth ly ren t p er square fo ot of o¢ c e spac e
WAG E Average we ek ly sa lary p er em p loye e for th e c el lu lar industry
OPERAT E Average m onth ly gen e ra l overh ea d a nd ope ratin g ex pen ses p e r square foot
POP M arket Populat ion in m il li on s DD
BUSINESS Numbe r of high poten tial bu sine ss estab li shm ents (divide d by 100)
T T im e tre nd in m onth s
ENTRY Dum my =1 after th e se cond carr i er en ters in to the m arket M SV
CROSSOW N Dum my =1 w hen th e two c om pet itors in one m arket are pa rtn er in any othe r m arket
M ULT IM KT Tota l num ber o f m a rke ts whe re the tw o c om pet itors face ea ch oth e r
LEAD Length of th e mo nopo ly p er io d in m on th s
BEL LB ELL Dum my =1 i f b oth wirel in e and nonw ire line co m pet itors are RB OC s Pair_ j
BEL LIND Dum my =1 i f the w irel in e is a B EL L and the non -wirel in e i s an ind ep e ndent c arr i er
INDB ELL Dum my =1 i f wi rel in e is an ind ep e ndent c arri er and the non -wirel in e i s a B ELL
INDIND Dum my =1 i f b oth wirel in e and nonw ire line co m pet itors are a n inde p enden t … rm
F irm Dum m ie s U s West C el lu lar, B el l S ou th M ob i li ty, Am e ri tech M ob il e, Nynex M ob il e, F irm s_i
South We st Bel l Mo bi le ,G te M ob il en et , Co ntel C ellu lar , M ccaw , Centu ry C el lu lar , R est
RE G Dum my =1 i f n o regu latory ban w as im pose d in the m arket Shew [19 94]
DEM 84, DEM 88 Dum my =1 i f the S ta te ’s G ove rno r was from the d em oc rat ic party in 1984 and 1988 re sp ect ively PV US Sta ti st ica l ab str
RE P84, RE P88 Dum my =1 i f the S ta te ’s G ove rno r was from the republ ic an pa rty in 1984 and 1988 re sp ec tively
GOVSTAB Dum my =1 i f in both elec t ion s in th e sam p le p e riod th e G overnor cam e from the sam e party
ELEC T Dum my =1 i f the regu la tor w as el ec te d RSC T he B ook of State s
APPOINT Dum my =1 i f the regu la tor w as appoin te d by poli t ic ian s
STAFF Numbe r of ful l-t im e em ployee s in th e S tate Pub li c U ti li ty Com m iss ion in 19 84 RC
¢STAFF C hange in th e num be r of fu l l-t im e em ployee s in the S tate Pub li c U til ity Com m ission (86-84)
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Tables
TABLE 1. SUMMARY STATISTICS
Full sample Sub-sample Sub-sample
Variables Regulation No Regulation
Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
p1 17.223 10.600 16.908 11.927 17.543 9.061
p2 196.126 39.418 197.787 40.596 194.434 38.182
p3 1025.402 233.428 1029.426 220.473 1021.304 246.274
ENERGY 1.778 0.438 1.783 0.528 1.773 0.322
PRIME (lagged) 9.518 1.069 9.456 1.087 9.582 1.050
RENT 16.062 5.032 16.901 6.252 15.206 3.153
WAGE 519.598 119.172 521.617 101.292 517.534 135.197
OPERATE 6.724 1.724 6.825 2.181 6.622 1.072
POP 0.193 0.278 0.225 0.365 0.161 0.135
BUSINESS 2253.494 406.391 2227.075 457.181 2280.407 345.901
T 21.463 11.842 21.763 11.925 21.158 11.771
ENTRY 0.727 0.446 0.783 0.413 0.670 0.471
CROSSOWN 0.341 0.475 0.239 0.427 0.446 0.498
MULTIMKT 3.571 2.805 2.960 1.809 4.195 3.437
LEAD 10.696 8.047 9.798 7.310 11.611 8.653
REG 0.505 0.500 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
DEM84 0.733 0.443 0.658 0.475 0.809 0.394
DEM88 0.583 0.494 0.636 0.482 0.528 0.500
REP84 0.267 0.443 0.342 0.475 0.191 0.394
REP88 0.417 0.494 0.363 0.482 0.472 0.500
GOVSTAB 0.579 0.494 0.721 0.450 0.434 0.497
ELECT 0.200 0.401 0.154 0.362 0.247 0.432
APPOINT 0.800 0.401 0.846 0.362 0.753 0.432
STAFF 271.308 227.115 322.320 268.281 219.341 160.085
¢STAFF -27.410 161.857 -73.092 212.731 19.127 50.729
Obs. 539 272 267
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TABLE 2. REGULATORY STATUS BY STATE
(Table 4.2. from Shew [1994])
Regulatory Status States
Regulatory Ban AL, CO, DE, FL, GA, IA, IL, KS, MI, MN,
MO, MT, NE, NJ, OR, PA,TN, TX,WA, WI
Tari¤ Regulation AZ, CA, CT, HI, IN, KY, LA, MA, MS,
NV, NM, NY, OH, OK, RI, SC, VA
Not in the Sample AK, ID, ME, ND, SD, VT, WV, WY
FIGURE 1. THE METROPOITAN AREAS
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TABLE 3. FIML ESTIMATES: PRICE EQUATION
REGUALTED MARKETS
Dep. Variable Low Usage Tari¤ Middle Usage Tari¤ High Usage Tari¤
(lnp1) (lnp2) (lnp3)
Coe¤. S.E. Coe¤. S.E. Coe¤. S.E.
CONSTANT 2.700 ¤¤¤ 1.017 5.192 ¤¤¤ 0.435 6.665 ¤¤¤ .418
OPERATE 0.64E-01 0.41E-01 0.17E-01 0.23E-01 0.16E-01 0.23E-01
ENERGY -0.110 0.198 -0.65E-01 0.51E-01 -0.80E-01 0.56E-01
WAGE 0.18E-03 0.97E-03 -0.57E-03 ¤¤ 0.25E-03 -0.22E-03 0.27E-03
RENT -0.75E-03 0.14E-01 0.86E-02 0.58E-02 0.13E-01 ¤¤ 0.59E-02
PRIME (lagged) -0.76E-01 0.58E-01 0.58E-02 0.21E-01 0.17E-01 0.22E-01
POP 0.278 0.201 0.139 ¤ 0.82E-01 0.72E-01 0.90E-01
BUSINESS 0.99E-04 0.13E-03 0.10E-03 ¤¤¤ 0.37E-04 0.36E-04 0.34E-04
T -0.951E-04 0.53E-02 -0.55E-02 ¤¤¤ 0.18E-02 -0.46E-02 ¤¤ 0.21E-02
CROSSOWN -0.464 ¤¤ 0.205 -0.43E-01 0.73E-01 0.40E-01 0.85E-01
MULTIMKT 0.74E-01 ¤ 0.43E-01 -0.18E-01 0.20E-01 -0.21E-01 0.21E-01
LEAD 0.78E-02 0.81E-02 0.55E-02 ¤ 0.28E-02 0.41E-02 0.28E-02
ENTRY -0.476 ¤¤¤ 0.167 0.28E-01 0.65E-01 0.35E-01 0.69E-01
BELLBELL -0.685 0.648 0.136 0.174 0.187 0.162
INDBELL -1.478 ¤¤¤ 0.370 -0.24E-02 0.111 -0.163 0.137
INDIND 0.13E-01 0.558 -0.19E-01 0.153 -0.97E-01 0.138
Firms dummies ¤(3=9) (0=9)
¤
(1=9)
¾1 0.620 ¤¤¤ 0.31E-01 0.142 ¤¤¤ 0.11E-01 0.220 ¤¤¤ 0.14E-01
½1 -0.949
¤¤¤ 0.41E-01 -0.641 ¤¤¤ 0.147 -0.932 ¤¤¤ 0.50E-01
Adj. R2 0.7913 0.5551 0.5960
Obs. 272 272 272
¤¤¤;¤¤ ;¤ represent signi…cance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels respectively
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TABLE 4. FIML ESTIMATES: PRICE EQUATION
NON-REGUALTED MARKETS
Dep. Variable Low Usage Tari¤ Middle Usage Tari¤ High Usage Tari¤
(lnp1) (lnp2) (lnp3)
Coe¤. St.Err. Coe¤. St.Err. Coe¤. St.Err.
CONSTANT 4.071 ¤¤¤ 1.256 4.831 ¤¤¤ 0.278 6.545 ¤¤¤ 0.407
OPERATE -0.89E-01 0.75E-01 -0.14E-01 0.17E-01 -0.20E-02 0.26E-01
ENERGY -0.80E-01 0.226 0.30E-01 0.53E-01 0.33E-01 0.75E-01
WAGE 0.99E-04 0.18E-03 0.10E-04 0.12E-03 -0.27E-04 0.18E-03
RENT 0.12E-01 0.23E-01 0.17E-02 0.61E-02 -0.22E-02 0.90E-02
PRIME (lagged) -0.34E-01 0.78E-01 0.52E-01 ¤¤¤ 0.18E-01 0.49E-01 ¤ 0.28E-01
POP 0.502 0.583 0.263 ¤ 0.152 0.173 0.215
BUSINESS 0.20E-03 0.23E-03 0.37E-04 0.46E-04 0.45E-04 0.76E-04
T -0.72E-02 0.78E-02 0.23E-02 0.17E-02 0.35E-02 0.26E-02
CROSSOWN 0.28E-03 0.202 -0.14E-02 0.47E-01 -0.102 0.69E-01
MULTIMKT 0.97E-01 ¤¤ 0.45E-01 0.12E-01 0.84E-02 0.20E-01 0.14E-01
LEAD -0.95E-02 0.10E-01 -0.29E-03 0.22E-02 -0.83E-03 0.36E-02
ENTRY -0.392 ¤¤ 0.178 0.11E-01 0.48E-01 0.103 0.69E-01
BELLBELL -0.793 ¤¤ 0.346 0.375 ¤¤¤ 0.83E-01 0.235 ¤¤ 0.114
INDBELL -0.73E-01 0.392 -0.128 ¤ 0.87E-01 -0.344 ¤¤ 0.136






¾0 0.467 ¤¤¤ 0.30E-01 0.148 ¤¤¤ 0.11E-01 0.155 ¤¤¤ 0.17E-01
½0 0.835
¤¤¤ 0.65E-01 0.245 0.485 0.445 0.372
Adj. R2 0.46127 0.6060 0.6172
Obs. 267 267 267
¤¤¤;¤¤ ;¤ represent signi…cance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels respectively
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Table 5. PREDICTED PRICES WITH and WITHOUT REGULATION:
REGUALTED MARKETS
Low Usage Tari¤ Middle Usage Tari¤ High Usage Tari¤
p^1 16.364 196.030 1020.101
(11.647) (33.346) (179.141)
p^1;0 19.022 217.621 1188.160
(10.658) (69.706) (407.524)
p^1;0 ¡ p^1 2.659 21.5909 168.059
(17.691) (66.651) (404.421)
Standard errors in parenthesis
Table 6. PREDICTED PRICES WITH and WITHOUT REGULATION:
NON-REGUALTED MARKETS
Low Usage Tari¤ Middle Usage Tari¤ High Usage Tari¤
p^0 21.269 200.979 1086.774
(10.439) (34.747) (205.602)
p^0;1 19.456 194.976 997.696
(8.761) (34.202) (185.043)
p^0;1 ¡ p^0 -1.813 -6.002¤ -89.078¤
(4.862) (4.276) (55.988)
Standard errors in parenthesis
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